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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The appellees maintain that this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the appellant has not complied with Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
If the Court rejects this argument, however, this Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal
under Utah Code §78-2-2 (1996) and Article VIII, §3 of the Constitution of the State of
Utah.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Does this Court have jurisdiction to hear this matter because the Estate of Kory Pasquin did not file its appeal within 30 days as required by Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure? This Court reviews this legal issue for correctness, State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991). This issue was preserved in the trial court in the
Final Judgment entered by the District Court on March 2, 1999 (R. 678), and by the
Stipulation of the parties dated December 23,1999 (R. 808-810).

2.

Is the Estate's appeal barred by the terms of the Stipulation dated December 23, 1999?
The legal issues raised by this issue are reviewed for correctness, State v. Petersen, 810
P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991), and the factual issues are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. David K. Mast v. Brent Overson, 971 P.2d 928 (Utah App.
1998.).This issue was preserved by the Stipulation of the parties dated December 23,
1999 (R. 808-810).

3.

Is there a statutory basis for the District Court's award of reasonable attorneys fees to
the appellees? This Court reviews the legal issues raised by the District Court's decision for correctness, State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991). This issue was
6

preserved in the trial court by Karly's Motion and Memorandum for Attorney's Fees
(R.4G4).
Does the doctrine of estoppel bar the Estate's appeal? This issue of law arises for the
first time on appeal, and arises because of the appeal; therefore, it could not be raised
at the District Court level. This Court has considered a new issue of law arising in an
appeal de novo. See, e.g., State v. Newman, 928 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah App. 1996).
Moreover, in the event that this Court reverses the District Court's rulings and remands for further proceedings, this Court should consider this issue because it would
arise on remand. See, e.g. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 795 n. 42 (Utah 1991). The issue
arises out of the Stipulation of the parties. (R. 808-810).
Does the doctrine of waiver bar the Estate's appeal? This issue of law arises for the first
time on appeal, and arises because of the appeal; therefore, it could not be raised at the
District Court level. This Court has considered a new issue of law arising in an appeal
de novo. See, e.g., State v. Newman, 928 P.2d 1040,1043 (Utah App. 1996). Moreover,
in the event that this Court reverses the District Court's rulings and remands for further proceedings, this Court should consider this issue because it would arise o n remand. See, e.g. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 795 n. 42 (Utah 1991). The issue arises out
of the Stipulation of the parties. (808-810).
Does the doctrine of quasi-estoppel bar the Estate's appeal? This issue of law arises for
the first time on appeal, and arises because of the appeal; therefore, it could not be
raised at the District Court level. This Court has considered a new issue of law arising
in an appeal de novo. See, e.g., State v. Newman, 928 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah App.
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1996). Moreover, in the event that this Court reverses the District Court's rulings and
remands for further proceedings, this Court should consider this issue because it
would arise on remand. See, e.g. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 795 n. 42 (Utah 1991).
The issue arises out of the Stipulation of the parties. (R. 808-810).
Does the doctrine of judicial estoppel bar the Estate's appeal? This issue of law arises
for the first time on appeal, and arises because of the appeal; therefore, it could not be
raised at the District Court level. This Court has considered a new issue of law arising
in an appeal de novo. See, e.g., State v. Newman, 928 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah App.
1996). Moreover, in the event that this Court reverses the District Court's rulings and
remands for further proceedings, this Court should consider this issue because it
would arise on remand. See, e.g. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 795 n. 42 (Utah 1991).
The issue arises out of the Stipulation of the parties and this appeal. (R. 808-810).
Is the Estate's appeal barred because it failed to raise its argument regarding the lack of
findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the award of Karly's attorney's fees at
the District Court level? This is a legal issue reviewed for correctness. State v. Petersen,
810 P.2d421,425 (Utah 1991).
Can this Court imply findings of fact in the ruhngs of the District Court awarding
Karly her attorney's fees and costs? The legal issues raised by this issue are reviewed
for correctness, State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991), and the factual issues
are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. David K. Mast v. Brent Overson,
971 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah App. 1998.). This issue was preserved in the trial court in the
Judgment entered by the District Court on March 2,1999 (R. 678), and by the Stipula-
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tion of the parties dated December 23, 1999 (R. 808-810).
10. Was the District Court's award of Karly's attorney's fees and costs reasonable? This
factual issue is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. David K. Mast v. Brent
Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah App. 1998.). This issue was preserved in the trial
court in the Order Awarding Attorney's Fees and Costs (R. 801-804) and by the
Court's Ruling of July 27,2000 (R. 937, 938-939).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutes are attached in the addendum:
Utah Code §§ 78-45a-2 through 78-45a-10 (1997).

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is a case about a little girl, Karly Madsen, and her four year battle to be recognized as
the heir of her father, Kory Pasquin, who died in a boating accident at Lake Powell. Karly
was born out of wedlock to Kory Pasquin and Kristie Madsen. Because of drug abuse problems, Kristie Madsen eventually surrendered all parental rights over Karly to Kristie's
mother, Yvette Madsen, who has since cared for the child and acted as her guardian. Kristie
is currently in drug rehabilitation.
Before Kory's death, Kristie informed Kory that he was Karly's father. In order to assure Kory that he was, indeed, Karly's father, Kory and Kristie went to the University of
Utah Eccles Institute of Human Genetics, DNA Paternity Testing Laboratory, to give blood
samples for the purpose of undergoing genetic testing to determine paternity. The DNA
tests showed, with an extraordinarily high degree of mathematical certainty, that Kory Pas-
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quin was Karly's natural father—the test resulted in a paternity index of 5021. The results
of the DNA test created a presumption of paternity under the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity, Utah Code § 78-45a-10(3)(a) (1997) (a paternity index of only 150 is necessary to create the statutory presumption).
Notwithstanding the overwhelmingly positive DNA test, however, after Kory's death
the Estate of Kory Pasquin refused to recognize Karly as an heir to the Estate. That was
made by Candace Suiter, a former girlfriend of Kory Pasquin, who had been appointed as
the Estate's personal representative. Ms. Suiter is the mother of Tory Pasquin. Kory Pasquin was also the natural father of Tory, who was born out of wedlock to Ms. Suiter. Ms.
Suiter's refusal to recognize Karly as an heir was a transparent attempt to keep all of the Estate's assets for the benefit of her own child, Tory Pasquin.
Therefore, the Estate objected to the DNA test under the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity, Utah Code §§ 78-45a-2 et seq. (UUAP), insisting that it had the right to a jury trial on
the paternity issue under the UUAP, in which Karly had to prove that she is Kory's child.
On December 1-2, 1998, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby presided over a jury trial
regarding the paternity issue and regarding whether Karly was an heir of the Estate. At trial,
Karly submitted evidence that included testimony of Kristie Madsen that Kory was, indeed,
Karly's father (after all, a mother would know). Kristie also testified that Kory had accompanied her to have blood drawn for the DNA test. In addition, Karly's expert witness testified as to the validity of the DNA test and the virtual certainty that Kory was Karly's natural
father. The jury rendered a verdict that Kory Pasquin was Karly's natural father and an heir
to the Estate.

10

Therefore, on March 2, 1999, Judge Cornaby entered a Final Judgment holding that
Karly was an heir entitled to one half of Kory Pasquin's Estate, and that Karly was entitled
to her reasonable attorney's fees and costs in an amount to be determined by the Court.
Karly's counsel then filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs, supported by the detailed
affidavit Qf her counsel. The Estate opposed Karly's motion for attorney s fees, protesting
that the amounts requested were unreasonable.
Judge Cornaby then held a hearing regarding the issue of fees, during which the Estate
called Karly's counsel as its sole witness. The Estate extensively cross examined Karly's
counsel regarding the fees and costs, and regarding his affidavit testimony. However, the
Estate submitted no evidence, either by affidavit or otherwise, to controvert the written and
oral testimony of Karly's counsel. The District Court also heard oral argument from both
parties regarding Karly's motion for fees. Finding that Karly's attorney's fees were reasonable, the District Court entered an order awarding Karly all of her attorney's fees in the
amount of $41,212.50 and $3,933.25 in itemized costs. The District Court rejected p a r t of
Karly's claim for costs, however, disallowing $800.03 in itemized costs.
The Estate then appealed all of the District Court's rulings, including the Final Judgment and the award of attorney's fees and costs (that appeal, #990315-SC, is hereinafter referred to as Pasquin I). After the Estate filed Pasquin I, however, one Sheri Marion filed, in
the District Court, a Petition for Determination of Additional Heirs and Demand for N o tice in the District Court. Sheri Marion's Petition alleged that her child, Kody Jon M a r i o n ,
was also the child and heir of Kory Pasquin. Following negotiations between counsel, all
three parties stipulated as follows: 1) genetic testing would be performed to determine
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whether Kory was also Kody's father, using the same laboratory, blood, DNA, and DNA information ofKory Pasquin that was used to determine that Kory was Karly's natural father;
2) if the DNA test established that Kory was Kody Marion's natural father, then it would
serve as "conclusive evidence" that Kory Pasquin was the father of both Karly Madsen and
Kody Marion; and 3) the Estate would then dismiss its appeal in Pasquin I; and 4) the parties would modify the Final Judgment solely to state that Kody Marion is the natural child
of Kory Pasquin and an heir entitled to one-third of the Estate (thus, each child would receive one-third of the estate). The parties filed their Stipulation with the Court.
The second DNA test established that Kory Pasquin was the natural father of Kody
Marion. Therefore, the Estate dismissed its appeal in Pasquin L Despite the Stipulation, the
Estate then filed a petition and several frivolous motions in the District Court attempting to
convince the District Court to vacate the Final Judgment it had appealed from in Pasquin I,
and sought to have the District Court reverse its award of Karly's fees and costs. The Estate
obviously sought to vacate the Final Judgment because it knew it was bound by that judgment, and that it had waived its right to appeal when it dismissed Pasqtdn L Ultimately, the
District Court denied the Estate's petition and motions, affirming its prior judgment and
orders, including the award of Karly's attorney's fees and costs.
On September 21, 2000, the District Court entered an Amended Final Judgment (amended solely to include Kody Marion as an heir of the Estate). The Amended Final
Judgment incorporated the previous Final Judgment and award of attorney's fees and costs
to Karly. Despite the Stipulation, the Estate has now filed the present appeal, seeking to relitigate issues regarding the award of Karly's attorney's fees and costs.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Some time in 1995, Kristie Madsen became pregnant with Koiy Pasquin's child. Kristie informed Kory that she was pregnant with his child. On February 5, 1996, Kristie
gave birth to Kory's child, Karly Madsen. (Trial Tr. Vol. 1, 57- 61 (December 1-2,
1999); R. 817, 57-61).

2.

After Karly's birth, Kory Pasquin told Kristie that he wanted to have genetic testing
done to determine whether he was Karly's father. Kory and Kristie then went to the
University of Utah Eccles Institute of Human Genetics, DNA Paternity Testing Laboratory, to give blood samples for the purpose of undergoing genetic testing to determine paternity. (Trial Tr. Vol. 1, 94-101; R. 817, 94-101).

3.

The DNA tests showed, with an extraordinarily high degree of mathematical certainty
(99.7%), that Kory Pasquin was Karly's natural father; the test resulted in a paternity
index of 5021. (Trial Tr. Vol. 2, 289-294; R. 818, 289-294).

4.

Kory Pasquin died on October 26,1996 when he was 28 years old. (R. 1) At the time of
Kory s death, Kory and Kristie Madsen were living together. (Trial Tr. Vol. 1, 53; R.
817,53).

5.

At the date of Kory's death, Tori Lynn Pasquin was listed in the official birth records
as his child. (R.2) Tory is the child Kory Pasquin and one Candace Souter, who was
one of Kory's former girl friends. (AfE Of Geri Pasquin J 3, R. 104). Thus, it appeared
that Kory died leaving behind two children.

6.

Candace Souter appeared and filed an Application for Informal Appointment as the
Personal Representative of the Estate, in which she represented to the Court that her
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child, Tory Pasquin, was the only child of Kory Pasquin. On March 4, 1997, Third
District Court Judge Tyrone E. Medley appointed Candace M. Souter, the mother of
Tory Pasquin, as the personal representative of the Estate of Kory Pasquin. (R. 8).
7.

On April 1, 1997, Kristie Madsen filed a petition claiming that Karly Madsen, as a
child of Kory Pasquin, had a "property right in or a claim against the decedent's estate..." (R. 11).

8.

Although Kristie initially appeared as guardian for Karly, because of drug abuse problems, Kristie was unable to fulfill her duties and obligations as a single parent for
Karly. Therefore, she surrendered all of her parental rights to Kristie's mother, Yvette
Madsen, who has been acting as Karly's parent and guardian. (Trial Tr., Vol. 1, 52; R.
817, 52). Kristie is currently in drug rehabilitation.

9.

The Estate opposed Karly's Petition, arguing that it was entitled to a trial in which
Karly had the burden of proving paternity. Judge Medley heard Karly's Petition and
referred it to the trial calendar of the Hon. Leslie A. Lewis. (R. 38).

10.

Because Ms. Souter had knowingly and intentionally misrepresented to the District
Court that Tory Pasquin was Kory's only child, Karly filed a motion to remove Candace Souter as personal representative of the estate. In support of her motion, Karly
filed the affidavits of Geri Pasquin (who is Kory's mother), Julie Flarity (who is Kory's
half-sister), and Kristie Madsen. All three affidavits contain sworn testimony that: 1)
all three witnesses knew that Karly was Kory's child; 2) Kory had openly acknowledged to them that Karly was his child; 3) Kory had supported Karly; 4) they k n e w Ms.
Souter; and 5) Ms. Souter had misrepresented to the District Court that Tory P a s q u i n
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was Kory s only child. (R. 104-109).
11. In her affidavit, Kory's mother, Geri Pasquin, testified that:
I have serious concerns about whether Candy Suitter is looking out for the
interest of all interested persons or whether she is only looking out for her
own interests and that of her daughter, Tori. Indeed, in my experience, she
has not exhibited the degree of objectivity and reasonableness one would expect from a Personal Representative of an Estate". (Aff. Geri Pasquin, 3" 9; R.
105).
12. In her affidavit, Julie Flarity testified that she knew both Ms. Souter and Kristie
Madsen, and that she had welcomed both women and their children into her home.
Julie testified that she spent many hours caring for both Karly and Tory. (Aff. Julie
Flarity 5 8; R. 107). Ms. Flarity testified that CCI am very concerned about whether
Candy Souter is acting in the best interests of both of his children, Tory Pasquin and
Karly Madsen." (Aff. Julie Flarity f 10; R. 107).
13. The District Court never ruled on Karly's motion to remove Ms. Souter as personal
representative of the Estate.
14. The Estate then argued to the District Court that Karly had to establish paternity at
trial under the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity, Utah Code §§ 78-45a-l et seq.
(UUAP) (R. 501). Under the UUAP, the standard of proof in a trial to determine paternity is "by a preponderance of the evidence." Utah Code § 78-45a-6.5 (1997).
15. Karly represented to the Gourt that instead of causing Kory's family the emotional
pain of exhuming Kory Pasquin's body to obtain DNA samples, at trial she would rely
on the DNA test that had previously determined that Kory was Karly's biological father. (R. 411).
16. The District Court granted the Estate's request for a trial, and scheduled a jury trial to
15

occur on December 1-2,1998.
17.

On January 16, 1998, Karly filed a motion to award her reasonable attorney's fees and
costs she had incurred and would be forced to incur through trial, thus preserving her
claim for attorney's fees and costs. (R. 404).

18.

The Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby presided over the jury trial on December 1 and 2,
1998. (Trial Tr., vol. 1,1; R. 817).

19.

After a two day trial, a jury rendered a verdict that Kory Pasquin was the natural father
of Karly Madsen and an heir to the Estate. (Trial Tr., Vol. 2, 357-360; R. 818, 375360).

20.

On March 2, 1999, the District Court entered its Final Judgment that Karly Madsen is
an heir of Kory Pasquin's Estate, and that she was thus entitled to one-half of the Estate. The Final Judgment also held that Karly was entitled to an award of reasonable
attorney's fees and costs incurred in pursuing her petition in an amount to be determined by the Court (R. 678) A copy of the Final Judgment is attached in the A d d e n dum to this brief.

21.

Therefore, on January 26, 1999 Karly's counsel, David W. Steffensen, filed an affidavit
regarding Karly's attorney's fees, costs, and witness fees incurred in litigating t h e paternity issue. Mr. Steffensen's affidavit detailed the experience of counsel, the h o u r l y
rate of counsel that was competitive in the community, and the number of hours
worked on the case. Attached and incorporated into Mr. Steffensen's affidavit was a
detailed itemized narrative of services rendered, including detailed descriptions of
work performed, when the work was performed, and time required for each task. (Aff.
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David W. Steffensen Regarding Attorney's Fees, Costs and Witness Fees (January 25,
1999); R. 639-650). A copy of Mr. Steffensen's Affidavit is attached in the Addendum
to this brief.
22.

The District Court reviewed the affidavit of Kariy's counsel, and on April 29, 1999,
held a hearing regarding Kariy's motion for attorney's fees and costs. During the hearing, the Estate called Karly's counsel as a witness and extensively cross-examined him
under oath. The District then heard oral argument regarding the motion. Ultimately,
the District Court awarded Karly attorney s fees of $41,212.50 and costs of $3,933.25.
The District Court denied Karly $800.03 of her itemized costs. (Order Awarding Attorney s Fees (August 24, 1999); R. 801-804). A copy of the Order is attached in the
Addendum to this brief.

23. The Estate filed a Notice of Appeal firom the Final Judgment on March 31, 1999, appealing all aspects of the District Court's rulings, including the award of Karly's attorney's fees and costs. (R. 686)
24. After the Estate filed its appeal one Sheri Marion filed, in the District Court, a Petition
for Determination of Additional Heirs and Demand for Notice in the District Court.
Sheri Marion's Petition alleged that her minor child, Kody Jon Marion, was also the
natural child and heir of Kory Pasquin. (R. 695)
25. Therefore, following negotiations between counsel, the parties stipulated as follows: 1)
a DNA test would be performed to determine whether Kory was also Kody's father,
using the same blood, DNA, and DNA information of Kory Pasquin that was used to
conclusively determine that Kory was Karly's natural father; 2) if the test was positive,
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the parties would add Kody Marion as an heir of the Estate; 3) if the DNA test established that Kory was Kody Marion's natural father, then it would serve as "conclusive
evidence" that Kory Pasquin was the father of both Karly Madsen and Kody Marion;
4) the Estate would then dismiss its appeal from the Final Judgment; and 5) the parties
would modify the Final Judgment to state that Kody Marion is the natural child of
Kory Pasquin and an heir of the Estate. The parties filed the Stipulation with the Court
on January 3, 2000. (R. 808-810) (the "Stipulation"). A copy of the Stipulation is attached in the Addendum to this brief.
26. The DNA test proved that Kory Pasquin was, indeed, the natural father of Kody
Marion. Therefore, the Estate filed Estate of Kory Pasquin's Notice of DNA Test Results and Recognition of Heirs, which gave notice that Karly was a child and heir of
Kory Pasquin. (R. 842)
27.

Therefore, the Estate dismissed its appeal from the Final Judgment (R. 820)

28. Recognizing that it was bound by the terms of the Stipulation and the Final Judgment,
the Estate then began an extensive battle to avoid the judgment and its award of
Karly's attorney's fees. The Estate filed, in the District Court, a Petition to Vacate Final
Judgment, and brought several frivolous motions in the District Court in an attempt
to convince the Court to vacate the Final Judgment and rescind its award of Karly's attorney s fees. (R. 822-824).
29. Ultimately, on July 27, 2000, the District Court issued an order entitled "Court's Ruling." The Court's Ruling denied the Estate's Petition to vacate the final judgment, and
stated:
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After again carefully reviewing the record, the Court agrees with Ms. Madsen
that the issue of attorney's fees has clearly been adjudicated in her favor.
Moreover, after reviewing the basis for this award, the Court remains convinced that it was proper in the first place. The Court is not inclined nor is
there a legal basis to revisit the issue of attorney's fees.
Court's Ruling, 2-3 (July 27, 2000); R. 937, 938-939). The Court entered the Amended Final
Judgment on September 26, 2000, which included Kody Marion as an heir. Thus, after considering the evidence, two District Court judges (Judges Cornaby and Lewis) separately
reached the same conclusion that the award of Karly's attorney's fees and costs was reasonable.
30. The Estate then filed a Notice of Appeal on October 17, 2000, appealing the award of
Karly's attorney's fees.
31. Although the Estate has always argued that Karly's attorney's fees of $41,212.50 were
unreasonable, the Estate filed in the District Court a Petition to Dispose of Estate
Property, dated June 7, 1999. The Petition revealed that John Pasquin, Kory's father,
had been paying the Estate's legal fees and costs, which amounted to $40,023.00. (Pet.
Dispose Estate Prop., 2, R. 760, 761, 764). Thus, Kory's father was fueling the battle to
block Karly's claim to her share of the Estate.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On -appeal, the Estate argues that this Court should reverse the District Court's award of
Karly's attorney's fees, and argues two issues: 1) there is purportedly no statutory basis for
the award of attorney's fees; and 2) the District Court failed to enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law to support the award of Karly's attorney's fees. However, the Estate also
argues a number of other issues that are scattered throughout its brief in random order.
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The Court should reject the Estate's arguments, and affirm the District Court's rulings
and the award of attorney's fees and costs to Karly for the following reasons:
1.

This Court has no jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the Estate did not file its appeal within thirty days of the entry of the Final Judgment in this matter as required by
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure;

2.

The Estate's appeal is barred by the terms of the Stipulation.

3.

There is explicit statutory authority for the award of Karly's attorney's fees;

4.

The Estate's appeal is barred by the doctrine of estoppel;

5.

The Estate's appeal is barred by the doctrine of waiver;

6.

The Estate's appeal is barred by the doctrine of quasi-estoppel;

7.

The Estate's appeal is barred by the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel;

8.

The Estate failed to raise the lack of findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding
the award of attorney's fees at the District Court level, and is thus barred from raising
it on appeal for the first time;

9.

Findings of fact and conclusions of law are implicit in the District Court's award of
attorney's fees and costs to Karly. Judge Cornaby, after reviewing written testimony
and evidence, and after presiding over a hearing, held Karly's attorney's fees and costs
to be reasonable and entered an order awarding her the fees. Moreover, Judge Lewis
carefully reviewed the evidence considered by Judge Cornaby, and issued a written
ruling upholding the award of attorney's fees; and

10. Karly's attorney's fees were reasonable.
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ARGUMENT
1.

This Court has no jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the Estate did not file its
appeal within thirty days of the entry of the Final Judgment in this matter as required
by Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The District Court entered the Final Judgment awarding Karly her attorney's fees and costs
on March 22, 1999. The Estate filed its Notice of Appeal in the present action on October
17, 2000, one year and seven months after the District Court entered its Final judgment.
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a notice of appeal must be
filed within 30 days of the date the District Court enters judgment or order appealed from.
Therefore, because the Notice of Appeal was not filed within 30 days of the date of the Final
Judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the Estate's appeal, and the Court should
dismiss the Estate's appeal.
2.

The Estate's appeal is barred by the terms of the Stipulation.

Under Utah law, stipulations are conclusive and binding on the parties.1 "Ordinarily, courts
are bound by the stipulations of the parties."2 Therefore, the Estate is bound by the terms of
the Stipulation.
Under the clear and unambiguous terms of the Stipulation, if genetic testing proved
that Kody Marion was Kory's child, the results were to be taken as "conclusive evidence"
that Karly is the natural child of Kory, "therefore determining once and for all that Kody

1

Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403, 406 (Utah App. 1990); Higley v. McDonald, 685 P.2d
496,499 (Utah 1984); Dove v. Cude, 710 P.2d 170,171 (Utah 1985).
2

First Denver Mortgage Investors v. Zundel, 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1979).
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Marion and Karly Madsen are heirs to the estate of Kory Pasquin." Stipulation 5" 2 (December 23, 1999). Furthermore, in such case, the Estate was required to dismiss its appeal in
Pasquin L If the Estate wanted to appeal the Final Judgment and award of Karly's attorney s
fees, it could have proceeded with Pasquin I. Instead, the Estate chose to enter into the
Stipulation. Karly relied on the Estate's agreement to dismiss its appeal when she entered
into the Stipulation—the sole further action to be the amendment of the Final Judgment to
include Kody as an heir.
The genetic testing proved that Kody Marion is the child of Kory Pasquin. Therefore,
it was conclusively determined that Karly is Kory's child, and an heir of the Estate. The Estate then dismissed its appeal in Pasquin L
Notwithstanding the Stipulation, in Appellant's Brief the Estate attempts to resurrect
the issue of paternity, extensively briefing the evidence Karly introduced at trial, and focusing primarily on the paternity issue. The Estate argues that Karly did not comply with the
requirements for genetic testing under Utah Code § 78-45a-10 (1997), and that she failed to
provide sufficient foundation for the genetic testing that she relied on at trial. The Estate's
lengthy recitation of the procedure, evidence, and testimony at trial is irrelevant to the present appeal, however, because the Stipulation renders all of these issues moot. Pursuant to
the Stipulation, it has now been conclusively established that Karly is the natural child of
Kory Pasquin. There is simply no issue regarding paternity, nor is there any issue as to
whether Karly's evidence satisfied the requirements of the Utah Uniform Paternity Act.
The Estate abandoned its appeal in Pasquin I. The terms of the Stipulation bar the Estate's present appeal and its attempt to revive issues of paternity. Therefore, this Court
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should reject the Estate's arguments, and affirm the District Court's rulings.
3.

There is a statutory basis for the award of Karly's attorney's fees and costs.

Even though there was a DNA test that proved that Kory Pasquin was Karly's father, under
Utah Code § 78-45a-10 (1997), the Estate objected to the DNA test that proved that Kory
Pasquin was Karly's father. The Estate insisted that it had the right to a trial at which Karly
had to establish paternity under the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity (R. 501). Therefore, the
District Court held a jury trial, the governing law being the UUAP, which resulted in a jury
verdict that Kory Pasquin was Karly's father. The UUAP explicitly provides for the award of
attorney's fees, witness fees, and costs upon a judgment of paternity. Utah Code § 78-45a5(4) (1997).3 Therefore, there is a clear and unambiguous statutory basis for the District
Court's award of Karly's attorney's fees and costs, and this Court should affirm the rulings
of the District Court.
4.

The Doctrine of estoppel bars the Estate from bringing this appeal.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that a party is estopped from asserting a legal position if
the following three elements are present:
(i) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with
a claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable action or inaction by the other party
taken or not taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act,
or failure to act; and (iii) injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission,
act, or failure to act.4

3

"The Court may enter an order awarding costs, attorney fees, and witness fees in the manner prescribed in Section 30-3-3 upon a judgment or acknowledgment of paternity." Utah
Code §78-45a-5(4) (1997).
4

S&G, Inc. v. Intermountain Power Agency, 913 P.2d 735, 741-42 (Utah 1996), quoting
CECO v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989).
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All three of the elements of estoppel are present in the Estate's appeal First, in the
Stipulation, the Estate agreed to withdraw its first appeal if DNA testing proved that Kory
Pasquin was the father of Kody Marion. Second, Karly took action by agreeing to the terms
of the stipulation if it contained a provision for dismissal of Pasquin I, and Karly agreed to
modification of the Final Judgment only if the Estate's appeal was dismissed. Third, Karly is
suffering injury by allowing the Estate to proceed with the present appeal. Karly is being
forced to incur substantial additional attorney's fees in connection with the appeal, and she
is forced to litigate an issue which was resolved by stipulation. Therefore, the Estate's appeal
is barred by the doctrine of estoppel, and the Court should affirm the District Court's rulings.
5.

The doctrine of waiver bars the Estate from bringing this appeal.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of waiver is the "intentional relinquishment of a known right," which occurs when three elements are present: "(1) an existing right, benefit, or advantage; (2) knowledge of its existence; and (3) an intention to relinquish the right."5 The Estate is barred by the doctrine of waiver because all three elements
of the doctrine are present in this case.
First, in the Stipulation, the Estate intentionally and knowingly relinquished an existing right to appeal the award of attorney's fees and costs—in fact, the Estate was pursuing
its rights in Pasquin I when it entered into the Stipulation, and the Estate voluntarily dismissed that appeal. Thus, there was the existence of a right, knowledge of its existence, and
an intention to relinquish that right. As the Utah Court of Appeals has said:
5

Soterslnc. v. DeseretFederal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 939-40 (Utah 1993).
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Generally in legal proceedings a party with knowledge of all the facts will not
be allowed to take a position, pursue that position to fruition, and later, with
no substantial change in circumstances, return to attack the validity of the
prior position or the outcome flowing from it 6
Therefore, the Estate's appeal is barred by the doctrine of waiver, and the Court
should affirm the District Court's rulings.
6.

The doctrine of quasi-estoppei bars the Estate from bringing this appeal*.

The doctrine of quasi-estoppel bars a party from changing its position in litigation when "it
appeals to the conscience of the court to prevent injustice by precluding a party from
asserting a right inconsistent with a position previously taken by him."7 The doctrine of
quasi-estoppel "was developed to prevent a party from retaining a benefit by asserting a position to the disadvantage of another and then asserting a right which is inconsistent with
that previous position."8 Quasi-estoppel operates to bar a party from asserting inconsistent
positions when the party (1) with knowledge of the facts (2) takes a position inconsistent
with its former position (3) to the disadvantage of another.9 Under the doctrine of quasiestoppel, "where one having the right to accept or reject a transaction or instrument takes

6

Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah App. 1990);
citing28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § § 68-70 (1966).

7

Willard v. Ward, 875 P.2d 441, 443 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994), citing Jamison v. Consolidated
Utilities, Inc., 576 P.2d 97, 102 (Alaska 1978)). See also Sailes v. Jones, 499 P.2d 721, 724
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1972), reh'd denied (quoting Unruh v. Industrial Comm'n, 301 P.2d 1029,
1031 (Ariz. 1956)); Pattisonv. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 495 P.2d975, 980 (Kan. 1972).

8

Keesee v. Fetzek, 723 P.2d 904, 905 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986).

9

See Steubner Realty 19, Ltd v. Cravens Rd. 88, Ltd., 817 S.W.2d 160, 164 (Tex. App. 1991)
(citing Stimpson v. Piano Indep. School Dist, 743 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tex. App. 1987, writ denied)', 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 107 (1964)).
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and retains benefits thereunder, he ratifies it, and cannot avoid its obligation or effect by
taking a position inconsistent with it."
The elements of quasi-estoppel are present in this appeal. In the Stipulation, the Estate
agreed to dismiss its appeal, and Karly entered into the Stipulation in reliance upon the Estate's promise to dismiss its appeal. The Estate did dismiss Pasquin L However, the Estate
now wishes to renew its appeal, to the disadvantage of Karly Madsen. Therefore, the doctrine of quasi-estoppel bars the Estate's present appeal, and this Court should and affirm
the rulings of the District Court.
7.

The Doctrine of judicial estoppel bars the Estate from bringing this appeal.

Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, a "person may not, to the prejudice of another person deny any position taken in a prior judicial proceeding between the same persons or
their privies involving the same subject-matter, if such prior position is successfully maintained."11 In the Stipulation entered while Pasquin I was pending, the Estate took the position that if a DNA test proved that Kody Marion was Kory Pasquin's child, then that test
would serve as "conclusive evidence" that Karly Madsen was Kory's child. The Estate also
took the position that it would then dismiss its appeal in Pasquin I.
Nonetheless, the Estate has revived its appeal, and argues issues regarding paternity
and the award of Karly5 s attorney's fees and costs. The doctrine of judicial estoppel bars this
appeal, which is inconsistent with the Stipulation in the prior proceeding. Therefore, this

Carolina Medicorp, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of North Carolina Teachers1 and State Employees' Comprehensive Major Med. Plan, 456 S.E.2d 116,120 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995).
11

Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline, 913 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1996); see also Salt Lake City
v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 5 P.3d 1206, 1222 (Utah 2000).
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Court should affirm the District Court's rulings.
8.

The Estate's appeal is barred because it failed to raise the lack of findings of fact and
conclusions of law regarding the award of attorney's fees at the District Court level.

The Estate argues that this Court should reverse the District Court's award of Karly's attorney's fees and costs because the District Court did not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the fee award. However, the Court's Order Awarding Attorney s
Fees, Costs, and Witness Fees contains an extensive and detailed recitation of the facts, testimony, pleadings, papers, hearing, and arguments upon which it based its decision to
award Karly her fees. Thus, although the District Court did not caption its Order as "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law," the Order contains the substance that would be contained in findings.
Moreover, at the trial level, the Estate vigorously opposed the award of Karly's fees,
and argued the matter to two District Court judges, who both found the fees to be reasonable. Thus, the Estate had ample opportunity to request the entry of findings of fact, but it
did not do so. If the Estate had made such a request, the District Court could have obliged
the Estate by entering a separate document captioned "Findings of Fact." However, it is in
this appeal that the Estate raises the issue of findings for the first time.
It is axiomatic that this Court will not consider issues that can be raised at the trial
court level, but are raised for the first time on appeal.12 The rule against considering new is-

12

See, e.g., Espinalv. Salt Lake City Bd OfEduc, 797 P.2d412, 413 (Utah 1990); Progressive
Acquisition, Inc. v. Lytle, 806 P.2d 239, 242 (Utah App. 1991); Ringwood v. Foreign Auto
Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1358 (Utah App.), cert denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990);
Shire Dev. v. Frontier Invs., 799 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah App. 1990); Werner-Jacob sen v. Bednarik, 946 P.2d 744, 748 (Utah App. 1997); Certified Sur. Group, Ltd. v. UT Inc., 960 P.2d
904, 906 (Utah 1998).
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sues on appeal is ancient b Judge Ruggero Aldisert of the Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit has succinctly stated the rationale for the continued application of the ancient rule in
modern practice. Judge Aldisert has said that the reasons for the rule:
[G]o to the heart of the common law tradition and the adversary system. It
affords an opportunity for correction and avoidance in the trial court in various ways: it gives the adversary the opportunity either to avoid the challenged
action or to present a reasoned defense of the trial court's action; and it provides the trial court with the alternative of altering or modifying a decision or of
ordering a more fully developed recordfor review, (emphasis added).
If an appellate court were to deviate from this ancient rule, it would inject a degree of
uncertainty into the law that is detrimental to our system of justice, and weaken the predictability that is an important part of appellate review. Without this predictability, appellate review is degraded into a process in which appellants attempt to relitigate the issues and
to persuade the appellate court that the trial court did not reach the "right" result. Thus,
every appeal would become a de novo proceeding in which the appellate court holds a trial
on the merits. This is exactly what the Estate attempts to do in the present appeal.
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure embodies the rationale for the ancient
rule against considering new issues on appeal. Rule 46 requires a party, "at the time the rul-

13

R. Martineau, Modern Appellate Practice: Federal and State Civil Appeals § 1.1 (1983); R.
Pound, Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases, 38-71 (1941); C. Warren, A History of the American Bar 39-324 (1911 & reprint 1980); Martineau, The Value ofAppellate Oral Argument: A
Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 1-11 (1986); Sunderland, Improvement ofAppellate Procedure, 26 IowaL. Rev. 3, 7-12 (1940).
14

Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 678 F.2d 453, 456-457 n.l (3d Cir. 1982), vacated
and remanded, 462 U.S. 523 (1983).
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ing or order of the court is made or sought/' to make "known to the court the action which
he desires the Court to take or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds
therefore...." The Estate failed to comply with Rule 46 by not requesting that the District
Court enter findings of fact and conclusions of law when the Court entered its order regarding the award of Karly's attorney's fees and costs.
Therefore, this Court should enforce Rule 46, adhere to the ancient rule against considering new issues on appeal, and affirm the District Court's award of Karly's attorney's
fees and costs.
9.

Findings of fact and conclusions of law are implicit in the District Court's award of
Karly's attorney's fees and costs.

Although the District Court did not enter a document entitled "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" regarding the award of Karly's attorney's fees and costs, findings "can be
implied if it is reasonable to assume that the trial court actually considered the controverted
evidence and necessarily made afinding".15The Court should imply findings in the District
Court's award of Karly's attorney's fees for the following reasons:
1.

Karly's counsel submitted a detailed affidavit setting forth his hourly rate and the
hourly rates of those who assisted him with the case, which were similar to the rates
charged by similar attorneys for similar services in Salt Lake City;

2.

The affidavit of Karly's counsel included a detailed itemized description of all work
performed on the paternity case, including a description of what work was performed
and the time spent on each task;

See, e.g., Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1025 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
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The affidavit of Karly's counsel included only time and costs spent on the paternity
litigation; explicitly omitted were some of Karl/s attorney's fees, which were related
only to the probate litigation and not related to the paternity litigation;
At the Estate's request, Judge Cornaby presided over a hearing regarding Karly's motion for attorney's fees and costs, and at the hearing the Estate called Karly's counsel,
David W. Steffensen, as its only witness, subjecting Mr. Steffensen to extensive crossexamination regarding Karly's attorney's fees and costs;
Judge Cornaby heard oral argument from both Karly's counsel and the Estate regarding Karly's motion for attorney's fees and costs;
The Estate introduced no evidence or expert witness testimony to controvert the affidavit and oral testimony of Karly's counsel regarding her fees;
At the April 29, 1999 hearing, Judge Cornaby ruled that Karly was entided to her attorney's fees and most of her costs. In the Order Awarding Attorney's Fees, Costs, and
Witness Fees to Karly, 1-2 (August 24, 1999), the District Court explicitiy identified
the extensive material upon which it relied in making its award:
[Hjaving reviewed Petitioner, Karly Madsen's, Motion to Award Attorney's
Fees and Costs, Petitioners Memorandum in Support thereof, the Affidavit of
David W. Steffensen Regarding Attorney's Fees, Costs, and Witness Expenses, The Estate's Consolidated Response to Pending Trial and Discovery
Motions, the Estate's Request for Hearing on Pending Trial and Discovery
Motions, the Estate's Memorandum in Opposition to Karly Madsen's Motion for Attorney's Fees, Petitioner's Reply Memorandum to the Estate's
Consolidated Response to Pending Trial and Discovery Motions, Petitioner's
Reply Memorandum to the Estate's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion
for Attorney's Fees, the Final Judgment, the other pleadings in this matter,
having further received sworn testimony from David W. Steffensen at the
hearing held on the Motion on April 29, 1999, who was cross examined
thereon by counsel for the Decedent's Estate, and having further heard and
considered the arguments of counsel for Petitioner, Karly Madsen, and for
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the Decedent's Estate at said hearing held on the Motion on April 29, 1999,
and good cause appearing therefore . . .
8.

The August 24,1999 Order itemizes each cost awarded to Karly;

9.

After the Estate dismissed its first appeal, it brought in the District Court a Petition to
Vacate Final Judgment, seeking a reversal of the award of Karly's fees and costs. Judge
Leslie Lewis issued a ruling denying the Estate's Petition, and stated:
After again carefully reviewing the record, the Court agrees with Ms. Madsen
that the issue of attorney's fees has clearly been adjudicated in her favor.
Moreover, after reviewing the basis for this award, the Court remains convinced that it was proper in the first place. The Court is not inclined nor is
there a legal basis to revisit the issue of attorney's fees.
Court's Ruling, 2-3 (July 27,2000)(R. 937, 938-939).

10. Thus, after considering the written evidence, all of the papers filed by the parties, hearing witness testimony, and hearing the oral arguments of the parties, two District
Court judges (Judges Cornaby and Lewis) separately reached the same conclusion
that the award of Karly's attorney's fees and costs was reasonable.
It is indisputable that the District Court considered all of the evidence in the record
regarding attorney's fees and costs—Karly's evidence being uncontroverted by the Estate,
which submitted no evidence at all. It is thus reasonable to assume that the District Court
necessarily made findings supporting its award of Karly's attorney's fees and costs. Therefore, this Court should imply findings of fact and conclusions of law, and affirm the District
Court's award of Karly's attorney's fees and costs.
10. The award of Karly's attorney's fees and costs was reasonable.

Rule 24(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires a party to provide, under
appropriate headings, "a statement of the issues presented for review, including for each
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority." In Appellant's Brief, the
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the standard of appellate review with supporting authority." In Appellant's Brief, the Estate
identifies only two issues on appeal. The Estate does not identify the reasonableness of the
award of Karly's attorney's fees as an issue on appeal. Nonetheless, the Estate argues, at
great length, that the fee award was unreasonable. Because the Estate did not comply with
Rule 24(5) in raising the reasonableness issue, this Court should not consider the issue.
However, Karly will briefly address the reasonableness issue in the event that the Court
does consider the Estate's argument
The Estate argues that preparing for and trying the paternity case should have cost "no
more than $5,000." (Appellant's Brief at 16). Yet Karly was required to incur substantially
more in legal fees because the Estate has employed an endless series of complex legal tactics
that constitute conduct perhaps exceeded only by that of the poisoning princes of the
Medici family in Renaissance Italy. Kory Pasquin's father, determined to keep Karly from
her rightful inheritance, personally incurred over $40,000 in attorney's fees on behalf of the
Estate, and has asked that the Estate reimburse him for those fees. Thus, the fees the Estate
has incurred in simply defending the case were substantially the same as the fees incurred
by Karly, even though it was Karly who bore the burden of proving paternity. Therefore, it
is ludicrous for the Estate to argue that Karly's fees are unreasonable.
Moreover, the Affidavit of David W. Steffensen regarding Karly's attorney's fees and
costs, and the testimony during the hearing on the attorney's fees issues, prove that the District Court must have considered the following:
L The legal work that Karly's counsel actually performed;
2. The legal work Karly's counsel performed was reasonably necessary to adequately
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prosecute the matter;
3. Karly's counsel had a billing rate consistent with the rates customarily charged in
Salt Lake City, Utah, for similar services; and
4. That there were circumstances that required consideration of additional factors, including those listed in Rule LI of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly:
a. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; Utah Code
of Professional Responsibility, R. 1.5(a)(1);
b. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; Utah
Code of Professional Responsibility, R. 1.5(a)(3);
c. The amount involved and the results obtained; Utah Code of Professional
Responsibility, R. 1.5(a)(4);
d. The ability of the lawyers representing Karly Madsen; Utah Code of Professional Responsibility, R. 1.5(a)(7).
Thus, the evidence presented to the District Court presented the factors required by the
Utah Supreme Court in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 992 (Utah 1988). Therefore, this Court should affirm the District Court's rulings.
CONCLUSION

The Estate raises only two issues on appeal. The Court should reject the Estate's ar-
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guments regarding both issues. Notwithstanding the Estate's argument to the contrary,
there is a clear and unambiguous statute that provides for the recovery of attorney s fees,
costs, and witness fees in paternity actions. Moreover, the District Court's orders awarding
attorney's fees were detailed enough to serve as findings of fact, and the Estate has waived
its right to challenge the alleged lack of findings by failing to raise the issue at the District
Court level. In addition, this Court should impute findings of fact in the District Court's
order awarding attorney's fees and costs. Thus, the Court should affirm the District Court's
rulings.
DATED this /$"

day of Tune, 2001.

Richard L. King
Counsel for Appellees
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ADDENDUM

Utah Code §§ 78-45a-2 through 78-45a-10 (1997).
Final Judgment (March 2,1999).
Affidavit of David W. Steffensen Regarding Attorney's Fees, Costs and Witness Fees
(January 26,1999).
Order Awarding Attorney's Fees (August 24,1999).
Stipulation (January 3,2000).

PART 1

78^45a-2

JUDICIAL CODE
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78-45a-2. D e t e r m i n a t i o n of p a t e r n i t y — Effect — Enforcement.
(1) Paternity may be determined upon:
(a) the petition of the mother, child, putative father, or the Office of
Recovery Services; or
(b) a voluntary declaration of paternity executed in accordance with
Title 78, Chapter 45e, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity Act.
(2) If paternity has been determined or has been acknowledged according to
the laws of this state or any other state, the liabilities of the father may be
enforced in the same or other proceedings by:
(a) the mother, child, the Office of Recovery Services, or the public
authority that has furnished or may furnish the reasonable expenses of
pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary support, or funeral expenses; and
(b) other persons including private agencies to the extent that they
have furnished the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary support, or funeral expenses.
(3) An adjudication of paternity or a voluntary declaration executed in
accordance with Title 78, Chapter 45e, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity Act,
shall be filed with the state registrar in accordance with Section 26-2-5.
(4) A party to an action under this chapter has a continuing obligation to
keep the court informed of the party's current address.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 2; 1990, ch.
245, § 23; 1994, ch. 127, § 2; 1997, ch. 232,
§ 74.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997 substituted "Office

78-45a-5.

of Recovery Services" for "public authority
chargeable by law with the support of the child"
m Subsection (l)(a); added "the Office of Recovery Services" in Subsection (2)(a); and added
Subsections (3) and (4).

Remedies.

(1) The district court has jurisdiction of an action to establish paternity. All
remedies for enforcement of judgments for expenses of pregnancy and confinement for a wife or for education, necessary support, or funeral expenses for
legitimate children shall apply The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify
or revoke a judgment for future education and necessary support. All remedies
under Title 78, Chapter 45f, Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, are
available for enforcement of duties of support under this chapter.
(2) (a) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor and
the state may proceed on behalf of the obligee or in its own behalf,
pursuant to the provisions of Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services, to
enforce that right of support against the obligor.
(b) The provisions of Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services, apply in
all actions by the state.
(c) Whenever the state commences an action under this chapter, it shall
be the duty of the attorney general or the county attorney of the county
where the obligee resides to represent the state. Neither the attorney
general nor the county attorney represents or has an attorney-client
relationship with the obligee or the obligor, in carrying out his responsibilities under this chapter.
(3) Upon motion by a party, the court shall issue a temporary order in a
paternity action to require the payment of child support pending a determination of paternity if there is clear and convincing evidence of paternity in the
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form of genetic test results under Section 78-45a-7 or 78-45a-10, or
evidence.
(4) The court may enter an order awarding costs, attorney fees, and w
fees in the manner prescribed by Section 30-3-3 upon a judgment or ack
edgment of paternity.
(5) Rule 55, Default Judgment, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, app]
paternity actions commenced under this chapter.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 5; 1975, ch. 96,
§ 24; 1990, ch. 183, § 60; 1992, ch. 160, § 2;
1993, ch. 137, § 16; 1994, ch. 140, § 16; 1997,
ch. 232, § 75.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, in the last sentence of Subsection (1) substituted "Title 78,
Chapter 45f, Uniform Interstate Family Sup-

port Act" for "Title 77, Chapter 31, L
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Ac
substituted "chapter" for "act"; in Sub
(2)(a) substituted "state" for "Departn
Human Services"; substituted "state" f
partment" throughout Subsections (2)(
(2)(c); added Subsection (3) and made J
redesignations; and made stylistic chan'

78-45a-6.5. S t a n d a r d of proof.
The standard of proof in a trial to determine paternity is "by a prepo
ance of the evidence."
History: C. 1953, 78-45a-6.5, enacted by
L. 1988, ch. 93, § 1; 1997, ch. 232, § 76.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-

ment, effective July 1, 1997, rewrote tl
tion.

78-45a-7. Authority for genetic testing.
(1) Upon motion of any party to the action, made at a time so as not to <
the proceedings unduly, the court shall order the mother, the child, an<
alleged father to submit to genetic testing if the request is supported
sworn statement by the requesting party:
(a) alleging paternity and setting forth facts establishing a reasor
possibility of the requisite sexual contact between the parties; or
(b) denying paternity and setting forth facts establishing a reasor
possibility of the nonexistence of sexual contact between the parties
(2) The court may, upon its own initiative, order the mother, the child,
the alleged father to submit to genetic testing.
(3) (a) The court shall order genetic testing:
(i) of a type generally acknowledged as reliable by accredit*
bodies designated by the federal Secretary of Health and Hu
Services; and
(ii) to be performed by a laboratory approved by such an ace
tation body,
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (6), the cost of genetic testing <
be paid by the party who requested it or shared between the parti
requested by the court, subject to recoupment against the party
challenges the existence or nonexistence of paternity if the result oi
genetic test is contrary to the position of the challenger.
(4) Upon request by a party, a court may order a second genetic test
complies with Subsection (3) if paid for in advance by the requesting party
requested within 15 days of the result of the first genetic test being sent tc
last-known address on file under Section 78-45a-2.
(5) If any party refuses to submit to genetic testing, the court may res
the question of paternity against that party, or may enforce its order if
rights of others and the interests of justice so require.
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JUDICIAL CODE

128

(6) The office may request genetic testing under this section and shall pay
)r genetic testing it requests subject to recoupment as provided in Section
2A-11-304 1
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, <j 7; 1992, ch.
0, <j 3; 1997, ch. 232, § 77.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendnt, effective July 1, 1997 added uif the reest is supported by a sworn statement by the
niesting party" in the opening paragraph of

l-45a-8, 78-45a-9.

Subsection (1), added Subsections (l)(a) and
(1Kb), deleted "or upon request made by or on
behalf of any person whose blood is involved**
after "initiative" in Subsection (2), added Subsections (3), (4), and (6) and made related
redesignations; and made stylistic changes

Repealed.

tepeals. — Laws 1997, ch 232, § 141 reIs §§ 78~45a-8 and 78-45a-9, as enacted by
/s 1965, ch 158, §§ 8 and 9, relating to

selection and compensation of experts, effective
July 1, 1997

-45a-10. Effect of genetic test results.
L) Genetic test results shall be admissible as evidence of paternity without
need for foundation testimony or other proof of authenticity or accuracy if
(a) of a type generally acknowledged as reliable by accreditation bodies
designated by the federal Secretary of Health and Human Services;
(b) performed by a laboratory approved by such an accreditation body;
and
(c) not objected to with particularity and in writing within 15 days after
the written test results being sent to the parties.
) (a) Upon a motion of a party, a court may receive testimony from genetic
testing experts and others involved in conducting the genetic tests if the
testimony(0 is based on a genetic test performed in accordance with Subsection 78-45a-7(3)(a) or 78-45a-7(4); and
(n) is useful to the court in determining paternity,
(b) Unless a party objects with particularity and in writing withm 15
lays after the written test results are sent to the last-known address of
hat party on file under Section 78-45a-2, testimony received under
Subsection (2)(a) shall be in affidavit form.
(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if genetic
estmg results in a paternity index of at least 150.
(b) A presumption under Subsection (3)(a) may only be rebutted by a
econd genetic test:
d) that complies with Subsection 78-45a-7(4); and
(ii) results m an exclusion.
If a presumption of paternity established under Subsection (1) is not
ted by a second genetic test under Subsection (2), the court shall issue an
establishing paternity
Bills for pregnancy, childbirth, and genetic testing are admissible as
ice without requiring third-party foundation testimony and shall constinma facie evidence of amounts incurred for such services or for testing
lalf of the child.
>ry: C. 1953, 78-45a-10, enacted by L.
h. 232, ^ 78.
als and Reenactments. — Laws
i 232, § 78 repeals former § 78-45a-10,

as amended by Laws 1992, ch. 160, § 4, prescribing the effect of genetic test results, and
enacts the present section, effective July 1,
1997
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78-45a-11.5. Social security n u m b e r in court records.
The social security number of any individual who is subject to a patern
determination shall be placed in the records relating to the matter.
History: C. 1953, 78-45a-11.5, enacted by
L. 1997, ch. 232, § 79.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 2
§ 142 makes the act effective on July 1, 19

CHAPTER 45e
VOLUNTARY DECLARATION OF
PATERNITY
Section
78-45e-2.

Voluntary declaration of paternity.

Section
78-45e-3.
78-45e-4.

Requirements for filing.
Rescission of the declaration.

78-45e-2. Voluntary declaration of paternity.
(1) (a) A voluntary declaration of paternity filed in compliance with th
chapter establishes a father-child relationship identical to the relationsh
established when a child is born to persons married to each other.
(b) When a voluntary declaration of paternity is filed, the liabilities
the father include, but are not limited to, the reasonable expense of tl
mother's pregnancy and confinement and for the education, necessa
support, and any funeral expenses for the child.
(c) When a father voluntarily declares paternity, his liability for pa
amounts due is limited to a period of four years immediately preceding tl
date that the voluntary declaration of paternity was filed.
(2) When a voluntary declaration of paternity is filed it shall be recognize
as a basis for a child support order without any further requirement <
proceeding regarding the establishment of paternity.
(3) The voluntary declaration of paternity may be completed and signed ar
time after the birth of the child. A voluntary declaration of paternity may n<
be executed or filed after consent to or relinquishment for adoption has bee
signed.
(4) The voluntary declaration of paternity shall become an amendment t
the original birth certificate. The original certificate and the declaration sha
be marked so as to be distinguishable. The declaration may be included as pai
of subsequently issued certified copies of the birth certificate. Alternativel
electronically issued copies of a certificate may reflect the amended informs
tion and the date of amendment only.
(5) The voluntary declaration of paternity shall be in the form prescribed b
the state registrar of vital statistics and shall be accompanied with a
explanation of the alternatives to, the legal consequences of, and the rights an
responsibilities that arise from signing the declaration.
(6) The social security number of any person who is subject to a voluntar
declaration of paternity shall be placed in the records relating to the matter
History: C. 1953, 78-45e-2, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 127, § 4; 1995, ch. 258, § 16; 1997,
ch. 232, § 80.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-

ment, effective July 1, 1997 added "and shall b
accompanied..." in Subsection (5) and adde
Subsection (6).

PART 2

DAVID W. STEFFENSEN, (A4677)
STEFFENSEN MCDONALD STEFFENSEN
675 East 2100 South, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801)485-1818

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH
PROBATE DIVISION

In the Matter of the Estate
FINAL JUDGEMENT
of
Probate No. 973900253
KORYPASQUIN,
Judge Leslie A. Lewis
Deceased.

A trial was held regarding the petitioner's Petition for Determination of Heirs, the
Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, presiding, on December 1 through December 2, 1998 before the
Court and a jury. The issues having been duly tried and the jury having duly rendered its verdict:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Karly Madsen is an
heir of Kory Pasquin's Estate entitled, under applicable statute, to one-half of Kory Pasquin's
intestate estate. It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that petitioner is entitled to reasonable
attorney's fees and costs incurred in pursuing her petition in an amount to be determined by the
Court, together with interest on such attorney's fees and costs accruing from the date this
judgment is entered by the court. It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that this judgment

may be supplemented with petitioner's reasonable attorney's fees and costs of collecting this
judgment, as may be established from time to time by affidavit.
DATED this .2-

day of

A?*rc/

., 199^1

BY THE COURT

HonoraW^Douglas L. Cornaby
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Javid W. Steffense
Attorney For Petitioner

Robert H. Copier
Attorney for the Estate of Kory Pasquin

?

MAILING CERTIFICATE
iA

I hereby certify that on this
m day of ^ QSAUJ^GV,^-^\
3 1999, I
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing paper to be mailed, jWstage prepaid, and
addressed to:
Robert Copier
200 Metro Place
243 East 400 South
Suit Lake City, Utah 84111

DATED this 2l

day of

v

J0^U^0^>

J

1999.

PART 3

DAVID W. STEFFENSEN, P.C. (4677)
STEFFENSEN • MCDONALD * STEFFENSEN
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 485-1818
Attorney for Petitioner, Karly Madsen

THIRD JUDICLAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH
PROBATE DIVISION

In the Matter of the Estate
of

AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID W. STEFFENSEN
REGARDING ATTORNEYS FEES,
COSTS AND WITNESS FEES

KORYPASQUTN,
Probate No. 973900253
Deceased.
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

STATE OF UTAH

}
)ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE }
David W. Steffensen, having been first duly sworn, avers as follows:
1.

My name is David W. Steffensen, and my business address is 2159 South 700

East, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106,485-1818.
2.

I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth in this Affidavit. If called upon

to do so, I could and would testify to these matters in a court of law.
3.

I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Utah. I have practiced in the

tax, estate planning and probate areas in Salt Lake County, Utah, for thirteen years. In addition,

Richard L. King, an attorney practicing in my office, is licensed to practice in the State of Utah,
and has so practiced law as a litigation attorney in Salt Lake County, Utah, for thirteen years. As
a result, I am familiar with the rates charged by attorneys in Salt Lake County, Utah.
4.

In April of 1997,1 was reiained IO represent Karly Madsen, a minor, who

successfully obtained a jury verdict on December 2, 1998, that she is an heir of the decedent,
Kory Pasquin. In August of 1998,1 requested and obtained the able assistance of Richard L.
King to help me finish the preparation of Karly Madsen's claim for trial, and to help me conduct
the trial.
5.

In performing that successful representation of Karly Madsen, I performed 223

hours of legal work, and Richard L. King performed, at my request and subject to my
supervision, 51.75 hours of legal work. At our hourly rate of $150 per hour, which rate is a
reasonable rate for attorneys with Mr. King's and my years of experience, the legal fees incurred
total $41,212.50. In this regard, it should be noted that the 223 hours of legal work performed by
me does not include 22 hours of work in representing Julie Flarity in her petition to have the
personal representative removed.
6.

In addition, I have incurred and paid for the following costs and expenses in

connection with this matter:
6/27/97

Constable

$10.00

10/11/97

Copying charges

12/15/97

Subpoena fees for depositions and trial

68.00

1/24/98

Constable

45.00

2/25/98

Rocky Mountain Reporting-Deposition

306.25

10/10/98

Binders/tabs for court pleadings

175.34

4.25

11/23/98

Dr. Kenneth Ward-Expert Witness Fee

1,000.00

12/31/98

Dr. Kenneth Ward-Expert Witness Fee

2,806.00

12/31/98

Billie Way: Transcript of Hearing

12/31/98

Westlaw research charges

TOTAL FEES AND COSTS:
7.

70.00
248.44
$4.733.28

A detailed narrative of the fees, description of services rendered and costs and

expenses incurred, totaling $45,945.78, is SQt forth in that certain Statement No. 1675 attached
hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit "A."
Dated this 2L day of January, 1999.

Subscribed and sworn to before me by David W. Steffensen, a person I either know or
who properly identified himself to me, this

day of January, 1999.

l ^ a r y Public

My Commission Expires:

,. x< _=rfs^\
0 ^^<JL\[!( ft&3 )*?
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N O f A R Y PUBLIC
GAIL LEVY

I
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675 E . 21 CO So., St©. 320 \
Salt L i k o City, L f s n 2 HC~ j
Comm'aalan Sypiuo
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DAVID W. STEFFENSEN, P.C.
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
(801) 485-1818

Karl17" Madsen
c/o Kristie Madsen, Guardian
13 2 7 West Diane Drive
Bennion UT 8412 3

Account No:
Statement No :

Attn: Kristie Madsen
Kory Pasquin Estate/Intestacy Claim

Hours
04/15/97 Telephone conference with Kristie regarding new
matter

.25

04/16/97 Review of probate file; legal research on
guardian ad litem

l.QG

04/17/97 Preparation of petition to probate court;
telephone conference with Kristie

2.5 0

04/18/97 Preparation of petition to probate court; office
conference with Kristie Madsen.
05/05/97 Review of withdrawal of counsel.
05/13/97 Office conference with Kristie Madsen regarding
hearing; review of documents.
05/14/97 Preparation of petition for determination of
heirs and attendance at hearing.

.50
-25

1.0 0
1.0 0

05/15/97 Review of documents received from Bob Copier.

.25

05/16/97 Preparation of letter to Bob Copier to demand
withdrawal of notice of claim disallowance.
05/26/97 Legal Research regarding paternity testing and
paternity evidentiary issues.

.50
1.0 0

05/28/97 Preparation of Objection to Disallowance of
Claim, Affidavits; telephone conference with Bob
Copier.

2.5 0

Page:
01/23/'
493-001
17<

Karly Madsen
Account No:
Statement No:
Kory Pasquin Estate/Intestacy Claim

Hours
05/29/97 Preparation of documents; office conference with
Geri Pasquin, Julie Flarity, and Kristie
Madsen;telephone conference with Bob Copier.

5.25

06/02/97 Review of dna subpoenas; telephone conference
with Terry Rooney (attorney for dna lab) ;
preparation of Gramma release authorizations.

.75

06/03/97 Review of objection; preparation of letter to Bob
Copier.

.25

06/04/97 Review of pleadings.

.25

0 6/2 0/97 Telephone conference with Bob Copier regarding
Gramma release form.

.50

06/27/97 Telephone conference with Bob Copierrs office;
preparation of letter to Bob Copier regarding
Gramma releases and motion to compel on dna test
records.

25

07/08/97 Telephone conference with Bob Copier regarding
releases for DNA tests.

25

07/22/97 Telephone conference with Bob Copier's office;
telephone conference with Bob Copier regarding
letuer; preparation of letter to Bob Copier.

2.50

07/23/97 Preparation of motion to compel on DNA test
documents; telephone conference with Kristie
Madsen; telephone conference with Bob Copier;
preparation of joint motion and order for release
of DNA test records.

4.00

0 8/28/97 Telephone conference with Kristie Madsen;
telephone conference with Geri Pasquin; work on
petitions.

.25

09/05/97 Preparation of letter to DNA lab to obtain
documents with court order to compel.

.25

09/15/97 Preparation of discovery responses.

1.00

Page: 2
01/23/99
493-OOOM
1702

Karly Madsen
Account No:
Statement No:
Kory Pasquin Estate/intestacy Claim

09/18/97 Office conference with Kristie Madsen; follow up.

Hours
1.25

09/22/97 Review of DNA testing documents; preparation of
letter to Bob Copier.

.75

09/25/97 Telephone conference with Michael Lawrence and
Yvette Madsen regarding social security issues;
review Copier's letter.

1.2 5

09/26/97 Preparation of interrogatories to Candy Suitter.

.50

10/2 0/9 7 Telephone conference with Yvette Madsen regarding
probate, Karly's social security benefits.

.50

10/21/97 Telephone conference with Division of Family
Services.

.25

10/28/97 Telephone conference with Geri pasquin;
preparation for status conference.

2.2 5

10/29/97 Attend pretrial status conference; out of the
office conference with Bob Copier, Geri Pasquin,
and Julie Flarity regarding settlement options.

2.50

11/04/97 Telephone conference with Yvette Madsen.

-25

11/07/97 Review of Bob Copier's letter, proposed N
settlement.

-75

11/11/97 Preparation of settlement documents.

.25

11/12/97 Preparation of settlement documents; telephone
conference with Geri Pasquin and Steve
Coonhousen.

4.00

11/13/97 Preparation of settlement documents; telephone
conference with Kristie Madsen regarding social
security.

2.00

11/14/97 Preparation of settlement documents.

.50

11/20/97 Telephone conference with Bob Copier regarding
settlement.

-25

01/23/
493-OC

in

Karly Madsen
Account No:
Statement No:
Kory Pasquin Estate/Intestacy Claim

12/01/97 Review of Bob Copier's motion/memo to strike
hearing; call to Geri Pasquin; telephone
conference with Bob Copier.

.75

12/02/9 7 Telephone conference with Bob Copier regarding
settlement.

1.0 0

12/04/97 Telephone conference with Bob Copier, Julie
Flarity, and Ceri Pasquin regarding settlement.

1.50

12/09/97 Preparation of letter to Bob Copier, witness
designations; telephone conferences with DNA lab,
Bob Copier; line up expert witness.

3.50

12/12/97 Office conference with Geri Pasquin; telephone
conference with Steve Taylor (John Pasquinrs
attorney) regarding taking John Pasquinrs
deposition.

2.25

12/15/97 Out of the office conference with Dr. Ken Ward
for expert interview.

1.0 0

12/16/97 Preparation for depositions; preparation of
letters to Copier.

1.5 0

12/18/97 work on discovery.

.50

12/19/97 Telephone conference with Geri Pasquin;
preparation for trial.
12/22/97 Work on discovery.

1.5 0
.50

12/26/97 Preparation of depositions; review of documents;
office conference with Kristie Madsen.
12/27/97 Preparation for depositions.
12/29/97 Preparation for and attend deposition of John
Pasquin; prepared deposition record of Candy
Suitter's deposition (she did not show).

5.0 0

12/30/97 Preparation of supplemental discovery responses.

2.00

4.00
3.50

Page: 4
01/23/99
493-0 00N
1702

Karly Madsen
Account No:
Statement No:
Kory Pasquin Estate/lntesuacy Claim

01/02/98 Preparation of motion to compel.
01/05/98 Preparation of objection to motion to strike.
01/06/98 Preparation of Objection to Motion to Strike,
memorandum, and supplemental affidavit.

Hours
2.00
4.00
8.50

01/07/98 Preparation of Objection, memorandum, telephone
conference with Kristie Madsen, trial
preparation.

5 ,00

01/08/98 Telephone conference with Yvette Madsen.

1.00

01/09/98 Preparation for trial.

.50

01/12/98 Preparation of objection, memorandum, pretrial
order, trial exhibits; telephone conference with
Dr. Hallam.

7.00

01/13/98 Preparation of pretrial order, motion in limine,
memorandum, jury instructions, voir dire, trial
exhibits.

7.75

01/14/98 Preparation of trial brief and other trial
documents.

5.50

Q1/1S/98 Preparation for and attend pretrial conference.

3 .50

01/20/98 Preparation of objection and motion to compel
Candy Suitter's deposition.

2 . 75

01/23/98 Out of the office conference with Robert Copier;
telephone conference with Robert Copier.

1.50

01/27/98 Preparation of reply memo to objection to jury
instructions, motion for summary judgment, and
supporting memorandum.

1.50

01/29/98 Preparation of reply memoranddum on consolidated
response.

1.50

02/03/98 Telephone conference with Yvette Madsen.

.25

01/23/
493-00
17

Karly Madsen
Account No
Statement No:
Kory Pasquin Estate/Intestacy Claim

02/06/98 Preparation of letters.
02/09/98 Review of documents from Robert Copier.

Hours
1.00
.25

02/13/98 Preparation of reply memoranda.

4.00

02/14/98 Telephone conference with Robert Copier.

1.75

02/20/98 Review of documents from Robert Copier.

.25

02/23/98 Preparation of objection to claim disallowance.

.75

04/17/98 Telephone conference with Julie Flarity for trial
preparation.

.25

05/14/98 Office conference with Bob Copier regarding new
trial date.

.75

06/12/98 Telephone conference with Geri Pasguin for trial
preparation.

.25

06/26/98 Preparation of witnesses for trial.

.25

07/13/98 Office conference with Geri Pasquin for trial
preparation.

.25

08/24/98 Preparation for trial.

.25

08/25/98 Preparation for trial.

3.50

08/26/98 Preparation for trial.

3. 00

09/01/98 Telephone conference with Julie Flarity regarding
trial preparation.

.25

09/04/98 Telephone conference with Dr. Ward's office
regarding DNA Lab's certification.

. 25

10/08/98 Preparation for motions argument.

6. 00

10/09/98 Preparation for motions argument.

1. 00

Page: 6
01/23/9S
493-0001\
1702

Karly Madsen
Account No:
Statement No:
Kory Pasquin Estate/Intestacy Claim

HeiUXS
10/21/98 Preparation for oral argument on all*pending
motions.

5 .00

10/22/98 Preparation for oral argument on pending motions,

1 .00

10/23/98 Preparation for oral argument on pending motions.

6 .00

10/2 9/98 Preparation for oral argument on all pending
motions.

1 .25

10/3 0/98 Preparation for and argue pending motions.

3 .00

11/02/98 Preparation of order on pending motions.

1 .00

11/05/98 Review of Copier's motion for Rule 54(b) relief.

.25

11/09/98 Preparation for trial.

4 .. 0 0

11/10/98 Preparation for trial.

3 .. 0 0

11/11/98 Preparation for trial.

.50

11/12/98 Preparation for trial.

1 .50

11/20/98 Preparation for meeting with Dr. Ward.

•75

11/23/98 Out of the office conference with Dr. Ward
regarding expert testimony.

4 . 00

11/24/98 Preparation for trial.

1 . 00

11/25/98 Preparation for trial.

1. 75

11/30/98 Preparation for trial.

13 . 00

12/01/98 Preparation for and conduct trial.

13 . 0 0

12/02/98 Preparation for and conduct trial.

9 . 00

12/03/98 Work on trial follow-up issues; preparation of
j udgment.

1. 00

01/23
4 93-0
1

Karly Madsen
Account No:
Statement No:
Kory Pasquin Estate/Intestacy Claim

Hours
1 2 / 3 1 / 9 8 T e l e p h o n e c o n f e r e n c e w i t h Y v e t t e Madsen r e g a r d i n g
t r i a l follow-up issues.

25

01/05/99 Preparation of affidavit regarding attorneys fees
and costs.

2.00

01/22/99 Preparation of judgment, affidavit re fees,
notice to submit
David W. Steffensen

2.50
223.00

08/25/98 Review of trial brief; work on trial preparation

1.00

08/26/98 Review of pleadings; preparation for trial

1.00

10/2 0/98 Legal Research regarding standards for admission
of scientific evidence and expert testimony
10/23/98 Preparation for trial

3.75
.25

11/11/98 Legal Research regarding requirements for Rule
54(b) relief; preparation of memorandum in
opposition to Motion for Rule 54(b) relief

4.25

11/16/98 Legal Research regarding Daubert standards and
DNA testing

4. 75

11/17/98 Preparation of Rule 54(b) memorandum in
opposition

.25

11/19/98 Legal Research regarding admissibility of RFLP
DNA tests and the DAubert/Rimmasch standard

4.75

11/24/98 Legal Research and drafting of Memorandum in
Support of Request for Judicial Notice that RFLP
test is inherently reliable

4.25

11/25/98 Legal Research regarding motion in limine and
memorandum in support thereof; preparation for
trial

4.5 0

11/3 0/98 Preparation for trial

5.0 0

page: t
0l/23/9b
493-G00>

no:

K a r l y Maasen

Ul/ZJ/

Kory P a s q u i n E s t a t e / I n t e s t a c y

Claim

A c c o u n t Mo:
S t a t e m e n t No:

12/01/98 Preparation for and attendance at trial

Hours
9.00

12/02/98 Preparation for and attendance at trial

9..00

Richard L. King

51.,75

274.75 41 r 212 .!

For Current Services Rendered
Timekeeper
David W. Steffensen
Richard L. King

493-00
17

Recapitulation
Hours Hourly Rate
223.00
51.75

$150.00
150.00

Total
$33,450.00
7,762.50
1 0 .i

06/27/97 Constable for Service of Process or Pleadings
10/11/97 Copying Charges
12/15/97 Subpoena fees for depos and trial (Zions Bank,
Candy Suitter, John Pasquin, and DNA Lab).
01/24/98 Constable for Service of Process or Pleadings.
02/25/98 Outside Professional Services: Rocky Mountain
Reporting Services.
10/10/98 Binders/tabs for court pleadings filed this week
11/23/98 Dr. Kenneth Ward, expert witness fees
12/31/98 Dr. Kenneth Ward, expert witness fee.
12/31/98 Billie Way: hearing transcript
12/31/98 Wesnlaw research charges (3098)
Total Expenses

4.:
68 .1
45.i
306.:
175.:
,
000.1
1,
2,, 806.1
70.(
248.'
4,.733 .:

Total Current Work

45,. 945.'

Balance Due

45,,945.'

PAYMENT IS DUE IN 10 DAYS. THEREAFTER, INTEREST AT
EIGHTEEN PERCENT (18%) A.P.R. WILL ACCRUE UNTIL PAID
IN FULL. CLIENT SHALL BE LIABLE FOR REASONABLE ATTORNEYS
FEES AND COSTS OF COLLECTION.

PART 4

DAVID W. STEFFENSEN, P.C. (4677)
STEFFENSEN * MCDONALD • STEFFENSEN
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 485-1818
Attorney for Petitioner, Karly Madsen

THIRD JUDICLAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH
PROBATE DIVISION

In the Matter of the Estate
of
KORY PASQUIN,
Deceased.

ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEYS
FEES, COSTS AND WITNESS FEES
Probate No. 973900253
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Petitioner, Karly Madsen's, Motion to Award Attorney's Fees and Costs came on for
hearing before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby on April 29? 1999. The Court, having
reviewed Petitioner, Karly Madsen's, Motion to Award Attorney's Fees and Costs, Petitioner's
Memorandum in Support thereof, the Affidavit of David W. Steffensen Regarding Attorney's
Fees, Costs and Witness Expenses, The Estate's Consolidated Response to Pending Trial and
Discovery Motions, the Estate's Request for Hearing on Pending Trial and Discovery Motions,
the Estate's Memorandum in Opposition to Karly Madsen's Motion for Attorney's Fees7
Petitioner's Reply Memorandum to the Estate's Consolidated Response to Pending Trial and
Discovery Motions, Petitioner's Reply Memorandum to the Estate's Memorandum in Opposition

EXHIBIT

nn

to Motion for Attorney's Fees, the Final Judgment, the other pleadings filed in this matter,
having further received sworn testimony from David W. Steffensen at the hearing held on the
Motion on April 29, 1999, who was cross examined thereon by counsel for the Decedent's
Estate, and having further heard and considered the arguments of counsel for Petitioner, Kariy
Madsen, and for the Decedent's Estate at said hearing held on the Motion on April 29, 1999, and
finding sood cause therefor:
HEREBY ORDERS that Petitioner Kariy Madsen's Motion to Award Attorney's Fees
and Costs is hereby granted in the following respects: First, all attorneys fees in the amount of
541,212.50 are approved and awarded to Petitioner, Kariy Madsen. Second, as to costs and
witness fees, the following costs and witness fees are approved and awarded to Petitioner, Kariy
Madsen:
1.

6/27/97

Constable

2.

10/11/97

Copying charges

3.

12/15/97

Subpoena fees for depositions and trial

68.00

4.

1/24/98

Constable

45.00

5.

11/23/98

Dr. Kenneth Ward-Expert Witness Fee

1,000.00

6.

12/31/98

Dr. Kenneth Ward-Expert Witness Fee

2,806.00

Total Approved Costs

$10.00

:

4.25

S3.933.25

The following applied for costs are disallowed:
1.

2/25/98

Rocky Mountain Reporting-Deposition

306.25

2.

10/10/98

Binders/tabs for court pleadings

175.34

3.

12/31/98

Billie Way: Transcript of Hearing

4.

12/31/98

Westlaw research charses

70.00
248.44

00802

Accordingly, the total amount of attorneys fees and costs awarded to Petitioner, Karly
Madsen, is 545,145.75, to be paid by th&Decedenf s Estate!
DATED this

^ ' dSTof / lUQ^SA.

0

1999.

HonorableB^Tid?? T rom^jr^
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Robert H. Copier
Attorney for the Estate of Kory Pasquin

' l.-A

PART 5

Attorneys for Petitioner Sheri Marion
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-6800

j£M
c

W -

3 p^uO

_J^ffl^^^

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PROBATE DIVISION

In the matter of the Estate
STIPULATION
of

:

KORY PASQUIN,
Deceased.

:

Probate No. 973900253 EI

:

Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Sheri Marion and Kody Marion by and through their counsel of record, Michael E.
Day; and Kristie Madsen and Karly Madsen by and through their counsel of record, David W.
Steffensen; and the Estate of Kory Pasquin. by and though Roben H. Copier hereby stipulate
and agree as follows:
1.

The parties stipulate to court-ordered DNx\ testing to be conducted using the

blood, DNA7 and DNA information that is already in the possession of the University of Utah
DNA lab that is purportedly the late Kory Pasquin's blood, DNA and DNA information and
for court-ordered DNA testing of Sheri Marion and Kody Marion for the purpose of
determining whether Kory Pasquin is the natural father of Kody Marion.
2.

The parties further stipulate that if the results from such DNA testing establish a

paternity index greater than 150 as between Kory Pasquin and Kody Marion, such results will
be taken as conclusive evidence that (1) Kody Marion is the natural child of Kory Pasquin, and
(2) Karly Madsen is the natural child of Kory Pasquin; therefore determining once and for all
that Kody Marion and Karly Madsen are heirs to the estate of Kory Pasquin. In such case, the
Estate of Kory Pasquin agrees to withdraw its appeal and the parties stipulate to modify the
Court's Final Judgment to state that Kody Marion is the natural child of Kory Pasquin and an
heir to his estate.
3.

In the tvent that there is not sufficient blood, DNA, or other DNA information

that is already in the possession of the University of Utah DNA lab to perform a reliable DNA
test, or the results from such testing exclude the late Kory Pasquin as the father of Kody
Marion or are otherwise inconclusive, then the parties stipulate that Kody Marion will not
suffer any prejudice whatsoever from said events, but that Kody Marion will be free to
otherwise establish that Kory Pasquin is his natural father, including, but not limited to, taking
such measures as petitioning the court for an order to exhume Kory Pasquin's body and obtain

oOcSnn

DNA testing using a DNA sample retrieved directly fro

asquin's body

DATED thisQ(JZ da-v ofiSwoiibef, 1999.

-TtC'Lyf.
(
Michael E. Day

XJ
Attorney for Sheri Marion ancTKody Marion

pberxJfe Copter
AEtorney\for Candance M Souter,
Personal representative for the
Estate of K&jry Easquin

D t o - W . SteffeiisenX//
Attorney for Kristie Madsen and Karly Madsen
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Richard L. King
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 485-7138
Bar Number: 4611
I, Richard L. King, certify that on June 29,20011 served two copies of
the attached Appellee's Brief upon Robert H. Copier, the counsel for
the appellant in this matter, by mailing it to him by first class mail
with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address:
Robert H. Copier
200 Metro Place
243 East 400 South
Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2803

Richard L. King
Attorney for Appellee
Karly Madsen

I

